Honeyfiles: Deceptive Files for Intrusion Detection by Yuill, Jim et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2004
Honeyfiles: Deceptive Files for Intrusion Detection
Yuill, Jim
þÿ Y u i l l ,   J . ,   Z a p p e ,   M . ,   D e n n i n g ,   D . ,   a n d   F r e e r ,   F . ,    H o n e y f i l e s :   D e c e p t i v e   F i l e s   f o r   I n t r u s i o n
þÿ D e t e c t i o n ,    P r o c .   I E E E   W o r k s h o p   o n   I n f o r m a t i o n   A s s u r a n c e ,   U . S .   M i l i t a r y   A c a d e m y ,   W e s t
Point, NY, June 2004. (.pdf)
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/37180
 Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE 
 Workshop on Information Assurance 




                                                          
Honeyfiles:  Deceptive Files for 
Intrusion Detection 
Jim Yuill, Mike Zappe, Dorothy Denning, and Fred Feer 
 
Abstract:  This paper introduces an intrusion-detection 
device named honeyfiles.  Honeyfiles are bait files intended 
for hackers to access.  The files reside on a file server, and 
the server sends an alarm when a honeyfile is accessed.  For 
example, a honeyfile named “passwords.txt” would be 
enticing to most hackers.  The file server’s end-users create 
honeyfiles, and the end-users receive the honeyfile’s alarms.  
Honeyfiles can increase a network’s internal security 
without adversely affecting normal operations.  The 
honeyfile system was tested by deploying it on a honeynet, 
where hackers’ use of honeyfiles was observed.  The use of 
honeynets to test a computer security device is also 
discussed.  This form of testing is a useful way of finding the 
faulty and overlooked assumptions made by the device’s 
developers. 
 
Index terms – deception, intrusion detection, computer 




Honeyfiles are an intrusion detection mechanism based on 
deception.  Specifically, a honeyfile is a bait file that is 
intended for hackers to open, and when the file is opened, 
an alarm is set off.  For example, a file named 
passwords.txt could be used as a honeyfile on a 
workstation.  Hackers who gain unauthorized access to 
the workstation will be lured by the file’s name, and when 
they open the file an alarm will be triggered. 
 
The concept of deploying bait files against hackers was 
pioneered by Cliff Stoll during his investigation of the 
German hackers who had penetrated his system at 
Lawrence Berkeley Labs, and elsewhere, in search of 
defense information that could be sold to the KGB [1].  
To determine the origin of the attacks, Stoll needed a way 
of keeping the hackers on-line long enough to trace their 
connection.  This was done by creating bait files that 
would appeal to the hackers and keep them occupied.  
The honeyfiles described in this paper extends Stoll's 
  This research was made possible by funding from The 
Office of Net Assessment, in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. 
concept to an automated intrusion-detection system for 
end users.  It monitors all file accesses and provides 
alarms whenever the bait files are accessed.     
 
Honeyfiles are implemented as a file server enhancement, 
and the file server’s users can make any of their files a 
honeyfile.  Alarms are sent by e-mail directly to the user, 
and services can be used to securely forward the e-mail to 
a phone or pager.  With honeyfiles, detection mechanisms  
can be effectively deployed, as they are placed by the end 
users who are intimately familiar with the network’s file 
spaces.  In addition, when an alarm is sent, those end 
users can easily and effectively interpret it. 
 
Honeyfiles can be used to detect unauthorized access to 
computers whose file space is mounted from a file server.  
For all but the smallest of organizations, standard industry 
practice is to store user and application data on file 
servers.  By implementing the alarm system on the file 
server, honeyfiles provide defense in depth for the file 
server’s clients.  Also, in protecting the clients, honeyfiles 
can detect unauthorized access gained through unknown 
attacks, as well as unauthorized access gained through 
unintended file-access permissions. 
 
When effectively deployed, it will be difficult for hackers 
to avoid honeyfiles, and honeyfiles show potential for 
avoiding some of the problems frequently encountered by 
network intrusion-detection systems (NIDSs), such as 
high false-positive rates and also high false-negative rates 
for unknown attacks.  Honeyfiles offer several additional 
benefits, such as the opportunity to increase a network’s 
internal security without impairing its normal operations.  
Further, the honeyfile system can be used to detect 
unauthorized access to real files (in addition to bait files), 
and this provides substantial advantages over alternative 
techniques such as cryptographic checksums for detecting 
file modification. 
 
A prototype honeyfile system has been implemented on 
the Network File Server (NFS), and it has been tested by 
subjecting it to hackers.  Honeyfiles, and the prototype, 
are further described in the following sections. 
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Figure 1 :  The honeyfile system 
II. THE HONEYFILE SYSTEM 
 
Honeyfiles are implemented by a honeyfile system, and it 
provides the necessary file-system and alarm functions.  
The file-system functions are implemented as an 
enhancement to a network file server, as illustrated in 
Figure 1.  The system’s components are numbered in the 
figure and their descriptions follow. 
 
Any file within the user’s file space can be a honeyfile.  
The honeyfile system provides an interface whereby file-
server users specify their honeyfiles (1).  A file records 
the system’s honeyfiles (5).  Each record contains a file 
name and user ID.  Honeyfile alarms are sent as email 
messages, so the user also provides an email address to be 
used.  The email messages are called email alerts, or 
simply alerts.  A file records the system’s users (4).  Each 
record contains a user ID and email address. 
 
To detect access to honeyfiles, the honeyfile system 
monitors all file access on the file server (3).  When a 
honeyfile is accessed, an alert is sent (2), and it is logged 
(6).  The alert includes the name of the opened honeyfile, 
and forensic information for incident response, such as 
the IP address of the computer that opened the file. 
 
The network can be configured for the email alerts to be 
sent in a secure manner.  Ideally, they will be sent to an 
automated service that will call the user’s cell phone and 
digitally display the email message (7).  This ensures 
secure delivery of the alert should the user’s mail client 
also be compromised.  Phone delivery also enables the 
user to be notified while away from his computer.  We 
implemented a prototype honeyfile system for NFS, on 
RedHat Linux 9.  We plan to distribute the prototype as 
open source.  The prototype is working, documented and 
tested.  This paper is an abridgement of the prototype’s 
documentation. 
 
III. USING HONEYFILES 
 
Honeyfiles can detect the hacker’s investigation and 
copying of files, including: 
• the hacker’s personal perusal of the file space.  
Hackers can be tricked into opening files with 
alluring names that indicate the file is of value. 
• the hacker’s use of search tools to find particular 
types of files, e.g., file names containing the string 
“password”.  These tools can examine file names or 
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contents.  Honeyfiles can be created to match 
common hacker searches. 
• the hacker’s use of tools like tar and zip, to copy and 
steal the contents of entire directories.  Such copying 
can be detected by placing honeyfiles in directories 
that are likely to be stolen, and the honeyfile’s name 
will blend in with the other files, e.g., “sysrun1.dll”. 
 
There are four types of files that are generally of interest 
to hackers, and that can often be used as honeyfiles: 
• files with information about  accessing and using 
other systems, such as password files (passwords.txt), 
user manuals (customer-accounts-system.pdf), and 
security documentation (vpn- instructions.doc), 
• system or application programs that the hacker may 
run, but that authorized users would not run, such as 
the gcc compiler, 
• files that contain evidence of the attack, such as log 
files, and 
• files that contain information of use other than 
hacking, such as credit card numbers, intellectual 
property, expected stock market prices, and military 
intelligence. 
 
A honeyfile should be named and located in such a way 
that its owner will not be inclined to open it accidentally.  
One technique is to give a honeyfile a name that appears 
unusual only to its owner.  The unusual name can help jog 
the owner’s memory and recognize the honeyfile.  For 
example, a honeyfile password file could be named 
complete-passwords.txt.  Its owner has no partial 
password files, so the prefix “complete” will help him 
recognize the honeyfile.1
 
Honeyfiles can contain deceptive content, such as fake 
user-IDs and passwords.  Deceptive file-content can take 
on a plethora of uses and forms, and it can be used 
independently of honeyfiles.  In order to concentrate on 
central honeyfile functions, this paper does not address 
deceptive content in honeyfiles.  Instead, it focuses on 
honeyfile deceptions involving just file system 
information, i.e., the file’s location and its directory entry, 
including its name. 
 
IV. HONEYFILE USES 
 
This section addresses honeyfiles’ detection capabilities, 
tactical capabilities, and ease of use. 
1  Unless stated otherwise, this paper’s masculine 
pronouns refer to both men and women. 
A. Detection Capabilities 
 
Honeyfiles’ detection capabilities include the following: 
 
• Honeyfiles can detect unauthorized access to 
computers and file systems: 
The primary strength of honeyfiles is their ability to 
detect unauthorized access to computers whose file-space 
resides on a file server.  For example, a workstation stores 
its user file-space on a file server, and the workstation 
automatically mounts the file-space at boot time.  If a 
hacker breaks into the workstation, his presence will be 
detected if he opens a honeyfile within the user file space. 
 
In general, honeyfiles detect unauthorized access to the 
file spaces on a file server, including:  1) compromise of 
the file space’s user ID and password,  2) compromise of 
weak or defective authentication mechanisms on the file 
server, e.g., NFS’ notoriously weak authentication, and  
3) exploitation of errors made in granting file-space 
permissions, e.g., accidentally making the file space 
“world readable”.   
 
• Honeyfiles can be used to detect unauthorized access 
gained through unknown attacks: 
Honeyfiles detect the hacker after he gains unauthorized 
or unintended access.  The detection mechanism is 
independent of the specific techniques used to gain 
access.  This is one of honeyfiles’ primary contributions.  
Honeyfiles offer a unique opportunity for detecting 
attackers who are able to defeat conventional defenses.  
This makes honeyfiles especially useful for protecting 
high-value systems that are subject to such skilled attacks.  
 
• Hackers can be highly vulnerable to honeyfile 
deceptions: 
Honeyfiles take advantage of several deception 
vulnerabilities in most hackers’ intelligence collection and 
analysis:  1) when hackers initially access a file space, 
they must search it in order to locate valuable data.  If the 
hacker’s search can be anticipated, honeyfiles can be 
placed where he is likely to encounter them.  2) The 
hacker’s limited knowledge of the file space makes it 
difficult for him to discern what truly belongs there, and 
his naiveté makes it easy to create deceptive honeyfiles.  
3) It can be very difficult for the hacker to detect a 
honeyfile before opening it.  The honeyfile deception is 
created using a small amount of information, i.e., the 
file’s directory entry, and usually, there is no way for the 
hacker to cross-verify the information, and  4) In most 
instances, if the target wants to know a honeyfile’s 
contents, his only option is to open the file and trigger the 
alarm. 
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• Honeyfiles can be used to protect a wide variety of 
files and computer systems: 
A honeyfile can be almost any file stored on a file server.  
In addition to regular data files, they can be files used by 
application programs, such as attachments within a mail 
client.  For example, a company’s executive email 
discloses corporate plans that will predictably affect the 
company’s stock price.  Such information could be 
extremely valuable to hackers.  Security personnel can 
work with the executives to place honeyfiles within their 
mail clients.  Honeyfiles can also be used to protect 
application programs.  For example, a web-server’s cgi-
bin directory can be populated with empty honeyfiles 
named after notoriously vulnerable scripts. 
 
• Honeyfiles show potential for avoiding some of the 
problems encountered by network intrusion-detection 
systems (NIDSs): 
NIDSs are typically very weak at detecting unknown 
attacks, whereas honeyfiles can detect unknown attacks 
and even access gained through unintentional file-access 
permissions.  Also, NIDSs can generate an exorbitant 
volume of false alarms.  In contrast, honeyfiles show the 
potential for having a much lower false alarm rate.  
Further, with NIDSs, false alarms are often investigated 
by a centralized security group that does not work directly 
with the protected data, making investigation difficult.  In 
contrast, honeyfile users can accurately and easily dismiss 
many false alarms because of their familiarity with the 
protected data. 
 
Honeyfiles make it possible for alarms to be deployed by 
the personnel who create and manage information assets.  
In contrast, when NIDSs are deployed by a centralized 
security group,  it can be difficult for them to accurately 
understand the network’s changing information assets. 
 
• The honeyfile system can be used to detect 
unauthorized access to real files, and it offers some 
substantial advantages over cryptographic 
checksums: 
In addition to detecting access to deceptive honeyfiles, the 
honeyfile system can be used to detect access to real files.  
For example, when a workstation user leaves work for the 
day, he could use the honeyfile system to set alarms for 
all of his files. 
 
The honeyfile system can be easily extended to provide 
alerts for honeyfiles when they are changed.  A popular 
technique for detecting file changes involves creating and 
storing cryptographic checksums.  The files’ checksums 
are periodically recalculated to detect changes to the files.  
Tripwire is a commercial product that uses this checksum 
technique. 
 
For detecting changed files on a file server, the extended 
honeyfile system provides two substantial improvements 
over the use of checksums:  1) the honeyfile system 
detects changes when they occur, whereas the checksum 
technique detects changes during periodic, and often 
infrequent, execution, and  2) the honeyfile system is 
simpler than the checksum technique.  The honeyfile 
system resides on the file server and an end user only has 
to specify the honeyfiles.  With the checksum technique, 
the checksums must be periodically calculated by the end 
user, or he must grant file access to a separate system that 
calculates the checksums.  If the user calculates the 
checksums, he must securely store the binaries and 
checksums.   
 
For a balanced assessment of checksums, it should be 
noted that checksums can protect local file systems, 
whereas honeyfiles can not.  Also, the use of both 
checksums and honeyfiles can provide defense in depth 
for detecting file changes. 
B. Tactical Capabilities 
 
Honeyfiles’ tactical capabilities stem mostly from:  1) 
decentralized deployment:  the network’s end users create 
and place alarms, and  2) centralized implementation:  the 
alarm mechanism resides on the file server rather than on 
its clients. 
 
• By enabling end-users to create alarms, the detection 
mechanisms can be effectively deployed and the 
alerts effectively interpreted: 
If honeyfiles are created and placed well, it can be 
difficult for hackers to avoid them, resulting in a low false 
negative rate.  End users are intimately familiar with the 
data they create and manage.  Honeyfiles make it possible 
for users to create and place alarms where they are most 
needed and where they will be most effective.  With some 
basic instruction on security and honeyfile tactics, users 
can effectively deploy honeyfiles.  Also, end users can 
evaluate and improve their alarms’ effectiveness because 
they receive alerts directly.  Further, end users can adapt 
their honeyfile use as the network and its threats change. 
 
Honeyfile users can accurately discern between true and 
false positives because they create the honeyfiles and 
receive the alerts.  For instance, if a user accidentally 
opens a honeyfile, the resultant alert can be recognized as 
a false positive.  If an alert is sent when the user is not 
accessing his file space, the alert can be recognized as a 
true positive. 
 
• Honeyfiles support defense-in-depth for the file 
server’s clients: 
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Honeyfiles provide the file server’s clients with an alarm 
system that resides outside of the client itself, and this 
adds a layer of depth to the client’s defenses.  When a 
hacker breaks into a client, the honeyfile’s alarm 
mechanism is on the file server, not on the client.  If the 
honeyfile’s alarm mechanism was on the client, the alarm 
would be vulnerable to attack or detection by the hacker, 
especially when the hacker has “rooted” the client 
computer.  Alerts are sent by e-mail, and they can be 
made to travel over a secure channel. 
 
• Honeyfiles can provide the security function of 
deterrence, and they can support incident response: 
In addition to detecting attacks, honeyfiles can deter 
attacks.  Honeyfiles have an affect that is similar to 
landmines:  if hackers know honeyfiles are being used, 
the use can dissuade them from hacking, and the use can 
slow hackers down by making them cautious and 
uncertain.  Honeyfiles are also useful for incident 
response.  Investigators can view all of the alerts for a 
network, and collectively, they may reveal a hacker’s 
capabilities, intentions, or courses of action. 
C. Ease of Use 
 
Honeyfiles’ ease of use is advantageous to both end users 
and security administrators: 
 
• Honeyfiles can enhance a network’s internal security 
without impairing normal operations: 
Networks typically use a relatively low level of internal 
security, as additional security is burdensome and costly.  
For example, extra access controls make resource sharing 
difficult, and making IDSs more sensitive increases their 
false alarm rates.  Honeyfiles can provide a means of 
increasing internal security without impairing operations.  
Honeyfiles have little adverse affect on legitimate 
computer use.  Also, honeyfiles can be an effective 
deterrent for insider hackers because they, like all other 
network users, will have been informed of the honeyfiles’ 
availability and use. 
 
• Honeyfiles are an effective deception because they 
can be easily created, require little falsehood, and 
involve little risk: 
A honeyfile is integrated within a real file space, and this 
real context makes the honeyfile deception easy to create 
and difficult to detect.  Also, honeyfiles themselves 
involve little falsehood—just a directory entry.  Further, 
honeyfiles involve little risk. 
 
• Implementing the alarm system on the file server 
makes honeyfiles available to almost all network 
computers: 
Honeyfiles can be created by any computer that uses the 
file server.  Honeyfiles can be used by computers with a 
wide variety of operating systems and file systems.  The 
alarm system does not have to be ported to the network’s 
various operating systems, e.g., Windows and Unix.  
Also, having a single alarm system makes it easier to train 
users. 
 
• Implementing the alarm system on the file server 
centralizes security management functions: 
Having a single alarm system makes the system’s 
maintenance and defense easier, as the system resides in 
one place, rather than on each of the client computers.  
Further, having a single alarm system makes it easier for 
network security personnel to monitor the alarm system’s 
overall use and effectiveness. 
 
V. ENHANCED  FUNCTIONS 
 
Earlier sections described basic honeyfile functions, and 
this section describes some enhancements that greatly 
improve honeyfile use.  These improvements have to do 
with maintaining realism and controlling alarms. 
 
Operational systems change over time, and so too must 
most honeyfiles if they are to be believable.  A file’s 
MAC times record when it was created, last modified, and 
last accessed.  Honeyfiles that portray in-use files must 
have their MAC times periodically updated.  The 
honeyfile system can solve this problem by periodically 
updating MAC times, within user-defined parameters. 
 
If deceptive content is being used, it may also need to 
change over time.  Although deceptive content is not 
addressed here, there is a noteworthy technique for 
automatically updating a file’s deceptive content.  The 
honeyfile’s contents can mirror a source file that is hidden 
from the target, and the honeyfile system can periodically 
update the honeyfile from the source.  
 
Honeyfile use can also be improved by providing controls 
for selectively generating alerts.  Some processes and 
users must be permitted to open honeyfiles without setting 
off alarms, such as tape-backup processes and the root 
user.   
 
VI. HONEYFILE LIMITATIONS 
 
Honeyfiles’ primary limitations are as follows: 
 
• Honeyfiles may not be viable in file spaces that 
require regular searching: 
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Honeyfiles will not be viable if file search tools generate 
frequent and unavoidable false alarms.  The honeyfile 
system could accommodate searches by enabling users to 
temporarily suspend their honeyfiles’ alerts.  However, a 
suspension function introduces vulnerabilities:  users may 
forget to resume honeyfile alerts, and the function could 
be hacked.   
 
• Honeyfiles are appropriate for file spaces that are 
accessible to one person or a small group: 
Honeyfiles are likely to be problematic if placed in a file 
space that is used by many people.  Honeyfile information 
would have to be communicated to the group.  Also, false 
alarms may be frequent and difficult to investigate. 
 
• Honeyfiles have tactical weaknesses that limit their 
use: 
Like most deceptions, honeyfiles provide uncertain 
effectiveness against an individual attack.  Many other 
security measures, such as strong encryption, are much 
more certain.  Also, honeyfile use will be limited if the 
target does not tend to explore the file system. 
 
There are some circumstances in which honeyfiles can be 
defeated.  There are ways in which a hacker can identify 
real files, and if he opens only them, he will avoid 
honeyfiles.  For example, a hacker can use a keystroke 
logger to learn what files are being used, and then open 
only them.  Another honeyfile vulnerability is overloading 
of the alert mechanism.  
 
• Honeyfiles require end-user involvement and skill: 
Effective honeyfile deployment requires user 
participation.  It cognitively taxes users by requiring them 
to manage and track honeyfiles.  Also, it requires users to 
have some security savvy as well as adeptness with 
computers.  Not all users will have the time or skills 
needed to use honeyfiles.  However, security personnel 
can provide some simple training that will be sufficient 
for many users.  Another potential cost of honeyfiles is 
the inadvertent deception of friendly personnel. 
 
VII. USING A HONEYNET TO TEST HONEYFILES 
 
The honeyfile system was tested by deploying it on the 
honeynet and thereby subjecting it to hacking.  Three 
hacking incidents were observed, and each involved a 
different hacker.  The three hackers were students from 
North Carolina State University who are skilled in 
computer security.  The hackers accessed a honeyfile 
system containing error reports and manuals for a 
mainframe system.  Each of the hackers was detected by 
at least one honeyfile.  The hackers did not find the file 
space very interesting, and they did not search it 
diligently.  This suggests that honeyfiles are more likely 
to be detected if they are near the file space’s root, where 
the hacker will start searching. 
 
Honeynets show much promise as a means for testing 
security devices.  They provide a realistic setting in which 
hackers can test the device.  The testing can be performed 
unwittingly by real hackers or by those recruited for the 
task.  There is a significant advantage in using testers 
from outside of the security device’s development team.  
Outside testers may reveal the developers’ faulty and 
overlooked assumptions.  Such errors are a common 
source of security vulnerabilities, and they are very 
difficult for developers to find themselves.   
 
Building the honeynet was non-trivial and substantially 
more time consuming than we expected.  Constructing 
deceptive files, file content,  and system footprints (e.g., 
file time-stamps) was especially challenging, as all the 




After years of research and development, computer 
security remains an error-prone task and, in some 
respects, a loosing battle.  Computer security’s chronic 
problems call for wholly new approaches.  Deception 
works in a fundamentally different way than conventional 
security.  Conventional security tends to work directly 
with the hacker’s actions, e.g., to prevent them or to 
detect them.  Deception manipulates the hacker’s thinking 
to make him act in a way that is advantageous to the 
defender.  Being fundamentally different, deception can 
be strong where conventional security is weak.  
Honeyfiles are a promising tool for intrusion detection.  
They offer significant advantages where conventional 
intrusion detection is weak.  A prototype honeyfile system 
has been constructed and tested, and we plan to distribute 
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